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Chapter VIII
Trade Policies and Colombia n D3velopm ent

The reader who has followed this book so far could expect this
last chapter to proyide a quantifi cation of the impact of changes in
Col~ubia n tr~de policies on that economy 's various developm ent targets in
the areas of efficien cy, growth, employm ent, income distribu tion and
depende nce.

The directio n of expected changes in the various magnitu des

should not be enou 6h; ideally somethin g should also be said about the like
ly magnitud e of the differen t effects.
No Guch scienti fic and credible quantif ication will be presente d

here.

Two interrel ated types of difficu lties ot:r.nd in the way.

As for

most countri es, no simple positive trade theory appears to explain accurat e
ly the evolving Colombi an trade structur e.

11n inelegan t and qualita tive

eclectic appeal to element s of positive theories of location , "vent-f or
surplus,1 1 Hecksch er-Ohlin , and the product cycle is the best one can do
to explain Colc:nbL m trnde :>atterns both with industri alized countri es, and
with other d::vclop ing countrie s, particu larly those in Latin P.merica .

While

these positive theories of trade q~rce on the nisty proposi tion that libcr.
aliz,Jd trndu policies coald and are likely to inprove the efficien cy (and
pe:i;-haps

gruwth) of a country without r.ionopoly power in interna tional markets ,

their predicti ons regardin g income distribu tion and employm ent effects of

trade liberali zation are even mistier , especia lly when one leaves the world
of two f,OOds and two factors.

VIII-2

A fairly disaggregat ed quantitativ e moc!<?l of the Colo.:ibian
economy, something which as yet does not exist, could sil'!llllate responses
to trade policy changes.

In this chapter, the kind of information one

,-10uld ideally want will be listed, and available data will be reviewed.
Rough orders-of-m agnitude estimates will be made whenever possible about
possible effects of trade policies.

As it should be clear from earlier chapters, Colombia has been
going through a period of trade liberalizat ion since 1967.

Thus, before

asking about possible effects of further liberalizat ion, a review of
major economic trends during 1967 through 1973 will be presented.

Then

we shall speculate on possible effects of further liberalizat ion on
efficiency, growth, income distributio n, employment and dependence.

The Record for 1967-1973
Foreign trade statistics, other partial data and national accounts,
the latter available only through 1972, show a notable change for the better
between 19-56-67, and 1967-1973.

But as can be seen in Table I-1, a good

share in that contrast can be explained by the difference in behavior of
the key exogenous variable, the dollar coffee price, which after falling
nt more than 3 percE'nt per year during 1956 through 1967, rose by more
1
than 6 percent per annum from 1967 through 1972.
Nevertheles s, a comparison of trade data for 1948-56 with those
for 1967-72 confirms what is known from previous chapters:

the improved

performance of recent years is not simply due to exogenous factors.

The
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rise in coffee prices during 1967-72 has been smaller than during 1948-56,
while the expansion of registered minor exports has been larger.

While

in the earlier years the share of minor exports tended to fall, it has
continued to rise significantly during 1967-72.

Furthermore, contrary

to what one expects for magnitudes which start from a small base, the
growth rate of minor exports ror;e between 1956-67 and 1967-72.

Undoubtedly,

many non-traditional exports benefitted from unusually high world prices,
particularly during 1972-73; but in most cases such exports had originally
responded to inducements originating in d~~estic policy, which stimulated
a sector which could so benefit.
The growth rate of real GDP has averaged more than 6 percent during
1967 throui:;h 1973, a figure somewhat hir,her than that for 1948 through
1956,

2

and sharply better, especially when viewed in per capita terms, than

the averaee 4.6 percent registered for 1956 through 1967.

All major GDP

components listed in Table I-2 shoH increases in their growth rate between
1956-67 au<l 1967-72, and all stand above their respective averages for the
whole 1950 throu?,h 1972 period.

At least for the level of aggregation

shown, it does not appear that the higher post-1967 grc,wth is due to pulling resources

~

of least productive (measured) activities and putting

them into nore produ-:tive ones; the growth profile thus has a uvent-forsurplus 11 flavor. 3

It may also be observed that the pos t-196 7 expansion

has a more balanced profile than that for 1950 throu~h 1956.

Note

especially the lower growth rate for construction and the higher one for
primary production.
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One way to investigate whether a significant change in the pattern
of Colo:r.binn cro\.Jth has occurred since 1967 is to examine how well average
growth r11tes for the postwar period fit post-1967 experience.

This has

been done for the output of major activities in agriculture, livestock
and manufacturing, as given in the national accounts, available from 1950
through 1972.

Each of the output indices [y] for those activities has

been fitted with the following regression:

As before, t 1 denotes a time trend variable going from 1 (for 1950)
through 23 (for 1972). The variable t 2 takes values of zero for 1950
through 1966t and values of 18, 19, ••• , 22, 23 for the six years included
in 1967 through 1972.

The b coefficient ,,ill then yield the avera8e growth

rate for the whole period; the c coefficient will give variations during
1967-72 from such an average.

In what follows, when the c coefficient

is twice or more its standard error, it will be deemed "significant,"
which of course does not imply it is lar!ier.

The positive or negative

deviations can be due to a variety of causes, inclu<ling policy changes not
directly related to the trade and payments system (,md changes in the
coverage of national accounts data!).

It could also be argued that lack

of a significant deviation from trend may result from conflicting in
fluences canccllins each other out.

But not having a complete model of

the Colombian economy, an obvious first step seems to be ex@nining the cl(:arcst
departures from trend, speculating later as to their meaning.
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The results frcm this exercise are presented in Tables VIII-1 and
VIII-2.

As

noted earlier, recent years have witnessed a slight pick up in

the mediocre growth rate for agricultu re and livestock .

Table VIII-1 shows

that significa ntly positive (although not necessari ly large) 1967-72 devia
tions from trend appear in garlic and onions, rice, potatoes, plaintain s,
mandioc, horses (!), and "other," both in agricultu re and livestock .

In

the Colombian context this group may be character ized as involving pre
dominantl y non-trac!e able goods.

Major export- crops, outside coffee, such

as cotton, bananas, cocoa, sugarcane and tobacco, as well as bovine cattle
fail to show significa nt accelerat ions in their growth rates during 1967-72.
But note, particula rly for cotton, sugarcane , nnd bovine cattle that trend
growth rates are impressiv e ones.

On

the whole, it would be difficult to

attribute the pick up in the :igricultu re and livestock growth rate after
1967 to further stimuli arising from the trade policies followed since

that year.

At best it could be argued that those policies helped sustain

continued divcr;:;if ication away from coffee and impressiv e growth rates in
several export-or iented activitie. s, which otherwise may have witnessed
slowdowns in performan ce, as in the case of some oilseeds which had been
orier:.ted primarily toward import-su bstitution .

Prelit:1ina ry data for 1973

show that output t>,rowth for. the whole of agricultu re and livestock has
remained somewhat above the t,hole postwar trend.

But no sharp break in

trend is apparent.
The man.ufactu1.:ing patten1, presented in Table VIII-2, is even more
difficult to charc\ctc rizc sioply.

First of all, while Table I-2 showed
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TABLE VIII-1

Agricultur·e m.1d Livestock: Average Annual Growth R&tes of Output
for 1950 throurh 1972, and Gro,~h Rate Deviations
During 1Y67 throuP,h 1972
(Standard errors in parentheses)

Trend growth r.ate
1950 through 1972
All agriculture

Deviation from
trend du ring
1967 through 1972

Garlic and Onions

2.98
(0.18)
13.25
(1. 91)
2.57
(1.21)

(0. 89)

Cotton

14.64

-1.76

(1.51)
4.77
(0.29)
1.98

(1.11)

Rice

0.73*
(0.21)

(1. 03)

(:).75)

4.25
(0.28)
2.20

-0.16
(0.21)
-0.81*

(0.31)

(0.23)

Sesame

Bananas for export
Cocoa
Coffee

0.24
(0.13)

-3.571:

(1.40)
2.68*

0.69

6.00

0.41
{0.30)

Rubber

(0.40)
5.03

Barley

(1.28)
4.59

Sugarcane

Copra

a

Beans
Corn

-1.81

(2.29)

(1. 72)

1.53

(1.17)

(0.85)

0.66
2.66
(O. 78)

Plantains

2.82

Handioc
Panela (unrefined brown sugar)
Other agriculture

(0.67)

-1.48

Potatoes

Wheat

-1.80*

(0.91)
11.42

(O. 47)

Tobacco

1.43
(0.91+)

-0.19
(O. 35) .
1.38)~

(0.57)
0.65*

(0 .14)
4.31
(0. 73)
-0.67
(1.02)
0.02

-1. 25*
(0.54)
-2.46*
(0.75)

(0.43)

(0.31)

5.65

(0. 43)
2.85
(0.19)

(0.10)

4.14*
-0.38

(0.32)
1.01*

(0.14)
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Table VIII-1
(continued)

Trend growth rate
1950 throurh 1972

All Livestock
Bovine beef cattle
Pigs
Sheep
Goats
Horses
Other livestock products

a

Deviation from
trend during
1967 throu~h 1972

3.68
(0.25)
4.42
(Oo56)
5.05
(1.10)
2.44
(1.36)
2.08
(1.51)
0.87
(0.46)
3.55
(0.23)

0.18
(O .18)
-0.15
(0.41)
-0.27
(0.81)
-1.22
(1.00)
0.55
(1.11)
0.90*
(0.34)
0.49*
(0.17)

Refers only to 1950 or 1967 through 1971.

*

Indicates that the coefficient for the deviation from trend is twice
or more of its t,tmidrn:d error. Both trend and deviation are expressed
aa annual percentages.

Sources £lnd 1:,ethod:

Basic data obtained from the Colombian National
Accounts (B dlR).
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Table VIII-2
Hanufacturinf-,:

Avera!'e Annual Growth Rates of Output

for 1950 throur;h 1972 t and Growth !~ate Deviations durinR 1967 through 1972

(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Trend growth rate
1950 through 1972
All Manufacturing

--Industrial Manufacturing
--small Scale Industry and handicrafts
,

Food Processing

Deviation from
trend during
1967 through 1972

6.23
(0.12)
7.03
(0.15)
3.26
(0.03)
5.98
(0.27)

4.57

Beverages

(0.26)
3.12
(0.25)
6.66
(0.35)
8.28
(0.20)

Tobacco Processing
Textiles
Shoes and clothing
Wood products and furniture
Paper products
Printing and publishing

4.80
(0.52)
10.94
(0.32)

7.95
(0.48)

4.46

Leather processing

(0.29)
8.72

Rubber products

(0.68).

Chemical products

· 8.33
(0.30)
9.57

Petroleum and coal derivatives
Non-metallic mineral products
Basic metal products
Mechanical and metallurgical products

(0. 48)
6.32

(0.34)
20.78
(2.38)
14.65

(0.43)

-0.12
(0.09)
-0.23*
(0.11)

0.09*
(0,02)
'0. 89*
(0,20) ·
0.21
(0,19)
0,92*
(0.19)
-0.63*
(0.26)
-0.15
(0.15)
-1.10*
(0. 38)
0.39
(0.23)
-0.65
(0.35)
0.03
(0.21)
-1.40*
(0.50)
-0.70*
(0.22)
-1.03*
(0. 35)
-0.58*
(0.25)

-5.67*
(1. 74)
-2.60*
(0,32)

*Indicates that the coefficient for the deviation from trend is twice or
more its standard error. Both trend and deviation are expressed as annual
percentages.
Sources and nethod:

Basic data obtained as in Table VIII-1.
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an increase in the manufacturing growth rate for 196 7 through 1972, in
contrast with that for the whole period, Table VIII-2 shows a slowdown
in the 1967-72 growth rate for ''modern" manufacturing.

The sensitivity

of the results to the use of the depressed 1967 as base year (as well as to
the relatively slow recovery in 1968) sur,gests that no great weight can be
attached to the apparent trend change.

Furthermore, preliminary data for

1973 indicate above average manufacturing growth rates.

On

the whole, it

is doubtful that when longer time series become available, one will be able
to establish a sienificant break in the manufacturing growth rate around 1967,
using the technique of Table VIII-2.
That table also shows a complete pattern of acceleration and decelera
tion in. growth rates for "modern" r:1.anufacturing branches.

Significant

declines appear for eight branches, significant increases for three, and
no significant chru1ges show up in five branches.

Among the eight activities

with declining growth rates, one finds several associated with strong
import substituting efforts, such as chemicals and basic metals, but also
branches like tc~ctiles, wood products and furniture, increasingly linked to
manufactured exports.

The three manufacturing activities with significant

acceleration in their growth rates during 1967-72 are also a mixed bag:
small scale industry and handicrafts, food processing and tobacco processing.
The three sell overwhelmingly to the domestic market, but presumably have
sharply different requirements for unskilled and skilled labor and capital.
Table VIII-3 provides some indirect information on the latter point; unfortu
nately, the cate5ories in Tables VIII-2 and VIII-3 are not exactly alike, and
neither source provides information on recent shares of output exported.

Ld.U..L.C

Y ,__..,_-_,

Rankins of Colombie.--i K..,nufacturing Activities According
to Value Add~d per i2!?lcied Person_ in 1967

(Shares in Percentages)
Value Added
Per Person
(Thousand
1967 Pesos)
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
ll.

12.
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.

25.

Petroleum and coal products
Tobacco products
Beverages
Chemicals other than pharmaceuticals
Phanaaceuticals and related products
Basic metal products
Paper products
Focd precessing
Rubb,;,:,r products
Electrical machinery, except
appliances
Electrical appliances
Other manufacturing
Textiles
Printing and publishing
Leather and products
Non-metallic mineral products
Metal products
Motor vehicles
Mechanical machinery
Non-electrical appliances
Wood and products
Clothing and footwear
Cer~~ic products
Furnitures and fixtures
Transport equipment, except
motor vehicles

277.7
185.0
135.9
87 .. 3
87.2
68.7
64.4

ALL }~l,'UFACTliRING

54.4

Sources and Method:

59.8
56.4

54.5
49.2
44.2
43.4
41.7
41.2
38.1
36.1
36.0

32.0
26.6
25.1
23.9
21.7
19.8
19.8

Share of
Total Value
Added

3.7
4.0
13.5
5.6
7.1
2.1
2.5
15.9
2.5
2.2

Share of
Total
Employment

0.7
1.2
5.4
3.5
4.8
1.7
2.2
14.4
2.4
2.2

1.0
2.7
13.0
~-1
1.1
5.0
4.4
1.9
1.2
0.2

1.1
3.3
16.3
4.0
1.4
7.1
6.6

1.0

2.1

4.2

9.5
1.3
1.7
1.9

o.s
o.6

0.7
100

2.9
2.0

0.3

100

Column
(b) Minus
Column
Cc)

3.0
2.8
8.1
2.1

2.9
0.4
0.3
1.5
0.1
0

-0.l
-0.6
-3.3
-0.9
-0.3
-2.1
-2.2
-1.0
-0.8

-0.1
-1.1
-5.3
-0.8
-1.1
-1.2
0

Share of
Imports in
D~estic
Market

Share of
Exports in
Domestic
Production

8.4

14.9
nil
nil

0.2
0.7
36.5

2.2

9.3
31.5
25.9
0.4
4.5
43.6

1.2
0.8
11.9
nil
3.3
1;.;2

2.0
19.6
2.3
1.7

nil
1.3
2.5
1.2
9.0

nil

3.6
10.5
37.0
87.0
nil
1.3
1.2

7.5
1.2

6.0
1.9

0.5
13.7
nil

15.4
0.4

80.2

5.6
1.1
nil

15.8

2.3

B.asic data obtained from DANE unpublished esti@'.ltes, as produced by IBRD unpublished documents. (See
World B:.mk, Economic GrcY..-t:h of Cok~:1hia: Prd,;_e-ms and Pros:;ccts, Balti1l'l0re and London, The John Hopkins
L-.iver.:Jity Pre°s:;, 1n2. PP• 49,a-:9I.:T-,c~;ti,c i!l3rket' 1 WilS defined as dc:::estic production plus io:ports
less \:'.,-i:po-x:ts. It reny b-~ noted th:1t the cl.:!f:ir,ition of manuf.::;.ctured experts excludes sliE:-itly processed
fo.J,J!:~t:£::s~' su::-h a1- s~_:r;ar..

r~·..i.;

Ii.\;;,,n rf::1art c:~itir:7.:ites

!'Ii::·.. nt.~f,:"~ctur~d

e:tports" at $55.,6 :·!illion in 1967.
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that
Nevcrth elc ss, from the first column in Table VIII-3 it may be assumed
activit ies like tobacco and food process ing have require ments for human

and physic al capita l per unit of output which exceed ed the manufa cturing
average .
On

the whole, it is difficu lt to detect a powerf ul and unambi guous

impact of post-19 67 trade policie s on the 1967-72 growth pattern of rural
and manufa cturing activi ties.

But besides the problem of untang ling the

les,
influen ce of new trade policie s fror11 those of· other policie s and varic1b
change s.
the 1967-72 period is perhap s too short to allow for structu ral
During 1967-7 2, for exampl e, the perform ance of individ ual manufa cturing
tu
activit ies was in many cases more influen ced by the long-ru n import -substi
on,
tion cycle than by the new export promot ion polici es, but such a situati
which can be noted in the rl~sidu als of severa l of the trend regres sions,
could change in the future.
Applic ation of the techniq ue used in Table VIII-1 and VIII-2 to the
ration
more aggreg ated nation al accoun ts indica tes signifi cant post-19 67 accele
in
in growth rates only for primary produc tion (in spite of decele ration
Type-I I
t:1inin3 , mainly petrole um), constru ction and what Table I-2 called
service s.

Constr uction and service s, of course , have a very small degree of

"trade ability . 11

Thus viewed , the post-19 67 accele ration in the growth rate

r
of GDP could hardly be said to rest on a realloc ation of resourc es, neithe
tradea ble
absolu te nor relativ e, from non-tra deable goods and service s toward
ones.
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Available data on 1967-73 changes in income distribution, employment
and degree of foreign ownership and control are weaker than reviewed output
indices.

In spite of this limitation, the rest of the chapter will attempt

to answer the question:

what can we expect, viewing the matter during 1974,

from further Colombian trade end exchange liberalization?

This will in-

volve reviewing (and some guessing) as to what has actually beel.). happening
to key variables during 1967-73.

Guessing will also be necessary regarding

the future trend of world prices for Colc;.nbian staples.

If coffee, cotton,

sugar, etc., were to keep their world prices reached during 1973, and so
did all other tradeables, the case for further real effective peso devalua
tions would become quite doubtful, and the ideal liberalization policy (as
well as its urgency) would be! different from that which would result from
expecting a 1956-57-style collapse of coffee (and other staples) prices.

Evidence on the Stntic Effici2ncy Effects of Colo8bian Trade Policies:
Review :md Outlod~
Colombian postwar trade and exchanie policies have induced static
inefficiencies in the sense that some of the foreign exchange saved by iuport
substitution could have been obtained cheaper, i.e., at lowe.r domestic re
source costs, by w;ing in e.."-port activities Colo:nbia11. resources \-:hich have.
low Oj)portuni ty costs, primarily natural resources of various kinds, and to
a lesser extent, unskilled labor.

This £orr,:iulation does not imply that

resources unused by those export activities which "could have been," or
which could have developed much earlier than they in fact did, found their
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way to the import substituting sector.

In the Colcmbian case it is more

accurate to regard a good share of those low opportunity cost resources re
maining untapped, as with natural resources, as blending into a murky non
tradeable or "informal" sector.

The blocking effect of trade and exchange

policies in the "vent for surplus" process will be discussed in the next
section, on the assumption that foreign non-preferenti al demand for many
actual and potential non-traditiona l Colombian exports is high.

Such a key

assumption is also made in this section, which will focus on prima facie
evidence of static inefficiencies .
Earlier chapters have provided documentation for the assumption that
during the postwar period Colombia could be said to have faced highly price
Such

elastic world demand for actual and potential non-traditiona l exports.
a statement is of course easier to-make ex-post than ex-ante.

The process

of finding new foreign markets is much l!lore complex than implied by the
small country assumption, and it is surrounded by considerable uncertainty
both for individual export products, and for the whole export drive.

Never

theless, on balance it appears that excessive elasticity-pess imism dominated
Colanbian policy, on the average, during the postwar.
As a result, postwar public policy offered, on balance, greater encourage
ment to import substitution than to exporting activities.

Detailed studies

on the exact incidence of such incentives are few, and available only for
the more recent years.

The most complete of them has been carried out by

4
Thomas L. Hutcheson, - who calculated, using various assumptions and methodo-

logies, effective rates of protection in 1969 for several manufacturing and

VIII-14

pr~r.ary activities.

This valuable study relied on comparisons between

Colombian and foreign prices for its calculations; his data crune predominant
ly from Colombian producers comparing their domestic price with their export

.

price.

5

Some of Hutcheson' s major results are presented in Table VIII-4; his
calculations of effective rates of protection include an estTinate of the
percent devaluation which would be required to maintain external balance if
the protective structure were removed.

Only one such estimate (34 percent

devaluation) is presented in Table VIII-4.

The theoretical and empirical

difficulties in all of these calculations are well known; nevertheless, a
major robust conclusion emerges from Hutcheson's results, showing the
large variance in the prote.ction received by different sectors in 1969.

The

generalization that, on average, manufacturing is protected while primary
production is not, c~1 be supplemented with the generalization that such a
pattern fluctuates considerably from branc:h to branch.

Indeed, if comparable

data were available, they would almost certainly show that net protection
also varies shnrply according to size of firm, or farm.
Tariffs, import controls, export subsidies and exchange rates are only
part of the state's arsenr.l of policy instruments~

Tax and credit incentives>

or direct official participation, can be of 13rcater importance for some pro
jects.

Furthen:iore, the exact incidence of the whole array of policy instru

ments can change from year to year, depending on such things as the actual
and expected relative price structure being signaled
markets in a given year.

to Colombia from world

Nevertheless, Hutcheson provides evidence indicatinr,

that his .measures of effective protection are significantly and positively
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Table VIII-4

Effectiv e Rates of Protecti on by Groups of Traded Sectors , 1969
(percen t)
Balassa Method, with

a 34 nercent exchang e
rate adjustm ent

Corden Method

Coffee

-45

-45

Hining

- 8

- 6
-19

Sugar
Primary , except coffee and mining
Food product s, except sugar
Beverag es
Tobacco
Textile s

-23
0
2

121
95
5

-22

Shoes

4

Clothing

-11
-25
12
11
-31
61

Wood product s
l'uniitu re
Paper- product s
Leather product s
Rubber product s
Ch:zmica l product s

Refinery product s
Non-Me tallic mineral products
Basic metals
Metal manufac ture

Non-Ele ctrical machine ry
Electri cal apparatu s
TranHpo rt equip.ne nt
Diverse industr ies
All roanuf ac tu ring
All Llanufac t u.ring, except

tobacco and beverage s
All nanufac turins, except sucar
Primary exports , c..xcept coffee and mining

Hc.nufac tured exports , except sugar

1

11
103
84
8

-10
13
1
-11

14
16
-26
56

- 5
- 8

4

151
47
- 7

39
43

0

12

44

668
319
89
29

40

25

*

610
117

50

33

18

18
21

21

*Negativ e value added.

Sources and r.1ethod:

Adapted from Table 3.5, p. 68, in Thomas L. Hutches on,
"Incenti ves for Industr ializati on in Colombi a," Ph.D.
c:1ir.;scr tation, Departm ent of Economi cs, Univers ity of
Michiga n, 1973.
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factur ing secto r.
relate d to growt h rates of diffe rent branc hes in the manu
by the Balas sa
He concl udes that prote ction , parti cular ly as measu red
n manu factur ing.
metho d, made a differ ence in the patte rn of growt h withi
d to slow econo mic
argue s that the struc ture of prote ction has contr ibute
growt h and incre asing uncm ployc ent.

He

Propo sing a polic y of unifo rm prote ction t

each secto r as speci ali
he expec ts that there would be much reshu ffling withi n
of secto rs.
zatio n occur red, but few cases of outri ght disap peara nce
rt-sub stitut ing
Comp arison of a few new expor t activ ities with some impo
gaps in the
indus tries, as they stood aroun d 1971, also yield ed large
order of two-t o-one .
dome stic resou rce costs betwe en the two group s, of the
leath er produ cts had
While , for examp le, expor ters of carna tions and some
obtai ned, respe ctive ly,
dome stic resou rce costs of 18 and 17 pesos per dolla r
iting
a firm produ cing speci nlize d texti le produ cts and benef

from prohi bi

rce costs of 36
tions again st comp etitio n from impor ts had dome stic r(;;sou
pesos per dolla r.

6

These examp les have a usefu l pedag ogica l purpo se, but

es withi n the
more needs to be said nbout the preva lence of both extrem
Colo:n bian secto rs produ cing trade able comm oditie s.
durin g 1967- 74,
The extra ordin ary expan sion of non-t radit ional expor ts
, has shown the large
althou gh aided by favor able world econ0t:1ic condi tions
hood with few
numbe r of varie d Colom bian activ ities which (in all likeli
about the excha nge
excep tions) have dome stic resou rce costs no highe r than
rate plus the CAT.
of GNP.

nt
By 1973, minor expor ts had ceach ed betwe en 5 and 6 perce

expor ts
Given an annua l growt h rate in the dolla r value of those

rios for which the
of about 15 perce nt, it is diffi cult to imagi ne scena
achie ved.
minor expor t share in Gl{P could be much highe r than that
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At the other extreme, the manufacturing activities found by Hutcheson
to have the most offensive effective rates of protection, say 40 percent and
above, account for about one third of value added in manufacturing (at
domestic prices), or between 6 and 7 percent of GNP.

A more precise identi

fication of the "horror stories" of import substitution can be given.
Prime candidates include:

the autanobile industry, which received impetus

during the late 1960s; petrochemicals and some chemicals, particularly
phannaceu ticals; electrical appliances, such as refrigerators and washing
machines; artificial fibers; and some alcoholic beverages (whiskey).

Thus

isolated, such sectors represent less than a third of manufacturing value
added, and 'What becanes remarkable is how much of Colombian manufacturing
operates around world prices.
On the other hand, as emphasized by Francisco Thoumi, the share of man
ufacturing investment captured during the last fifteen years by the "horror
stories" is an i.,npressive one.

It is estimated that between 1962 and 1967,

gross investments in petroleum derivatives, including petrochemicals ,
7
David Morawitz
amounted to pne fourth of all manufacturing investment.
reports that over 100 million dollars were invested in petrochemicals in
Colcr.ibia in the 1960s, and another 120 million dollars in scheduled to be
invested during the 1970s.

8

Such projects have also taken up an important
One

share of the limited pool of highly skilled professionals a..nd workers.
should note that sensible

cost-

,:m<l

cr.1ploy::1en.t-conscious criticisms of

petrochemical investments have been made to look less than ~arsighted by
the eccentric signals forthcoming from world narkets during 1973-74.

Substantial

direct aud indirect canmitments to the automobile industry have not yet found
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a redeeming historical accident.

9

It may be added that the participatio n

of direct foreign investment in many of the "horror stories," such as
automobiles , pharmaceut icals and artificial fibers, is large.

The horror

in those stories involves not just high real costs due to low production
runs, unsuitable factor combination $ and other standard reasons, but also
untaxed quasi-rents or excess profits earned by foreigners, and made possible
by the protection system.

Whether on its own or in partnership with foreign

or local investors, the public Institute of Industrial Development (IFI,
using its Spanish initials), has also involved its long-tenn credit facilities
into several ill-starred import substitutio n schemes, including

11

Forjas de

11
Colombia," making foundry products and rolling equipment and "COLCARRIL,

producing railraod wagons.

IFI participate d with Renault in the expansion

of the automotive industry, and with public Venezuelan capital in the
creation of a large plant for producing capro.:i.actmn, a sophisticat ed petro
chemical (Honomcros Colombo-Ve nezolanos).
The gradual lifting of import restriction s which has taken place since
196 7, and which appears to be acceleratin g during 1973-7 4 under the pressure
of bulging foreign exchange reserves and extraordina ry domestic inflation,
has probably removed static inefficienc ies involved in excessive precautio::ia ry.
10
Such
as well as speculntivc , holdings of inventories of importable goods.
inventories usually involve spare parts, intermediat e products and rau
materials, but could also include installed but unused imported machinery
and equipment.
A strong a priori case can be and has been made linking LDC import
licensing policies and generalized excess capacity in industry.

But in
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Colombia such a link appears weak.

The major research done on the utiliza

tion of fixed industrial capital in Colombia concludes,

11

first of all, that

capacity utilization for recent years is relatively high compared with the
few other countries for which there is infonnation .

The hours of capacity

use are related to long-run structural variables, including management
quality 5 , which are influenced by trade policy only indirectly.

Stop-go

cycles related to the foreign exchan~e bottleneck have influenced capacity
utilization , particularl y during 1956 throur,h 1967, and excess capacity in
the "horror stories" of import substitutio n can also be found, but no strong
general link appears to exist between import licensing as practiced in
Colombia and excess capacity.
While some ~jor ilnport substitutio n projects, whose efficiency was
far from obvious, were lnunched after 1967 (as in the case of automobiles
and some petrochemic als), the most recent yea:i::s have witnessed grm-:ing
public sector reluctance to support similar schemes.

Remember th,2t such

attitudes will not only be reflected in the tariff and the management of
:import controls, but also, and often mainly, in the promises made or with
held regarding credit, taxes and long term public support.

This new ambiance

in public developr.icn t offices, including IFI and othc:r public credit agencies,
has perhaps been t10re important for what it has kept fror:i happening, tn.m
for any tangible achievemen ts.
If extravag2.nt and massive new ventures into import substitutio n appear
on the decline, it r.amains true that the import control mechanism is still
vigorously used for protecting existing (and some new) activities, beyond the
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usually moderate tariff levels.

Even with foreign exchange reserves reach

ing $600 million during the first quarter of 1974, import controls remained
more restrictive than during 1966 (pre-November).

The biases described in

Chapter VI remain, and under present and expected circtm1stances, it is diffi
cult to make a good economic case for import controls as presently admin
istered.

Circumstances seem quite favorable for their retention only for

special cases involving health hazards, threats to public safety, etc., for
which tariffs may be insufficient.

Elimination of most import controls

should bring about modest gains in efficiency, and probably improve access
to imports for medium and small businessmen, as well as those outside Bogota
and Hedelli:n.

An announcement of the decision to gradually eliminate them,

accompanied by measures to be discussed below, should signal an even finner
government commitment to expanding the export sector.
The maintenance of some forms of exchange control, however, looks
necessary, less for balance of payments reasons than to execute other Colonbi;m
policies, such as vigilance over some kinds of capital inflows, particularly
direct foreign investment.

Standby exchan~e controls

r.1ay

not be a bad idea,

anyway, for balance of payments rcasoris, in a country like Colombia, still
wlnerable to unexpected changes in a far from stable world economy, and
not so rich in policy tools that it can afford to throw away one still widely
used in industrialized countries.
By signing the Cartagena Agreement creating the Andean Common Market,
Colombia ccxnmitted herself to a gradual loss of purely national control
over her tariffs.

A common external Andean tariff is to be agreed upon by
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1975, and should be fully implement ed by 1980.

12

The connnon minimum

external tariff agreed upon in December 1970, and toward which Colombia is
already moving, was not very different from the Colombian starting point,
and could be described on the whole as lower and less varied than prior
national tariffs.

The hope has been expressed that the eventual conmon

external tariff will be no higher, on average, than the minireura one, whose
average is about 50 percent.

The outlook is not clear, but Colombia has been

reported to oppose higher duties.
Ad hoc industria l compleme ntation agreement s among Andean countries ,
for which special protectio n would be granted, could nlso involve Colombia
in transande an import substitut ion schemes, some of uhich could rationali ze
existing and mostly inefficie nt industrie s (e.g., steel), but not all of
which could be desirable from an efficienc y viewpoin t.

Progress has been

slow in the negotiati on of such agreemen ts, which involve laborious and
detailed parcellin g out of plants among countries .

It is also reported that

Coloc.bia is on guard against the gestation , under these agreemen ts, of white
elephants of fmdean dimension s.
It may be noted that the eliminati on of tariffs and controls over most
intra-And ean con,--nodity flows, which should be completed for inflows into
Cola~bia also by 1980, should generate non-triv ial efficienc y gains and
exert a salutary competiti ve pressure on industry.

Contrary to a widesprea d

misconce ption, there is much room for trade creation within the Andean group
(a point discussed in the papers listed in footnote 12).
If import controls are eliminate d over all trade, and purely Colonbian
manaf;ement of import tariffs disappear s, exchange rate policy will lama
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even more important to keep possible balance of payments pressures from
leading to inefficient trade policies.

The point is reinforced by growing

recognition of the advisability of revamping the system of export subsidies.
As discussed in Chapter II, the CAT scheme has contributed to the expansion
of minor exports, but as already noted it shows technical faults generating
so:ne inefficiencies, and is becm.1ing increasinzly expensive in terr.is of foregone badly needed tax revenues.

Its gradual elimination, compensated by a

faster upward crawl in the exchange rate, could leave exporters, on the
average, no worse off than now, while providing more uniform incentives and
larger tax revenues.

13

Elimination of import controls, discussed above,

could help to offset the upward pressures on the domestic prices of import
able goods which such measures would imply, although available information
makes it difficult to be precise on this point, a further reason to handle
the whole package in gradual steps (and once the inflationary pressures
existing during the first half of 1974 are under control).

It may be noted

that the gradual elimination of both import contro_ls and export subsidies
may reduce frictions and quarrels both with trade partners in the Andean
region and elsewhere.

14

Since the crawlinr peg sys·tem was adopted in 1967, most observers sym
pathetic to ir.iport liberalization have felt that the crawl was too slow,
citing as ultimate proof the continued need of licensing to repress :imports,
and CAT to stimulate minor exports.

High and risins foreign exchange

reserves during 1973/74 suggest that the degree of peso overvaluation nay
have been suhstantially reduced, nnd some may even question whether over-
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valuation exists.
culations:

But 1973/74 show the complications of overvaluation cal-

much hinges on what one assuraes about the future of coffee and

other ccc.ciodity prices, as well as detailed elasticities in Colombian
trade with different geographical areas.

The latter is necessary, as the·

peso followtld the U .s. dollar_ after August 1971, and devalued with respect
to non-dollar key currencies.

Sustained inflation in industrialized

countries, of a type which may not be accurately reflected in price indices,
add to the difficulties of putting much confidence on calculations such as
those presented in Chapters 2 and 4.

One has to fall back to observing the

trend in foreign exchange reserves as import controls and CAT are gradually
removed, to be sure as to the degree of present and future overvaluation.
It also remains to be seen whether the crm-lling peg will be as successful
under accelerating inflation

as it was while Colombian inflation was re

duced in the context of a relatively st.able world price level.
Adoption of the policy p;.ckage described above would complete the
trend started in 1967, cmd put Colombia fully into the Bhagwat~-Krueger
Phase V.

The impact of such a step on GNP growth, say over the ten years

after it, is again difficult to quantify.
as u base of comparison

Note th3.t now we are not takin~

a situation characterized by rigid import controls

and stop-go cyclcn, such as that characterizing most of 1956-67, together

lS
·
·
·
•
•
t.
ie
•
su b stitut1on.
iuport
massive
an out 1 oo k· o f f·urtuer
witu

The question is

how much additional efficiency and growth would result from the suggested
step.

For reasons to be developed in the next section, it appears that the

major gains to be reaped from post-1967 policies have been already captured,
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to more than a frac tion of one
nnd furth er gain s nre unlik ely to amow 1t
perc ent per year in the GNP grow th rate .

Inde ed, given the conv entio ns and

the gain s may not even be refle cted
prac tice of natio nal acco untin 'g, some of
in GNP.

y
Swit ching a civi l serv ant with a Bive n salar

from revie w-ing

not affe ct GNP, at lens t for a
licen se appl icati ons to rura l teach ing will
deal ing with , or wiel ding , bure au
loni time . Psyc hic [pin s and losse s in
crat ic powe r go unre cord ed.

And so on.

But even takin B into acco unt poss ible

ct the elim inati on of impo rt cont rols
unre cord ed net gain s, one shou ld not expe
or the styl e of the Colo mbia n
to revo lutio nize eith er the effic ienc y
econ omic syste m.

litv and Gro\1 th
Trnck Poli cies , Forcd .rn Exch nnr:e Ava ilabi
nce of payra ents diff icul ties
Earl ier chap ters have emph asize d how bala
durin g 1956 throu gh 1967 . As shom ,
hamp ered Colo nbian !}row th, part icul arly
inery and equip ment , and asso ciate d
in Tabl e VIII -5, gros s invcs tmen t in mach
on impo rts. Duri ng the late 1950 s
tcchn olop ;ical chan ge• stil l rely heav ily
dent in the impo rted shar e; the
the new stee l mill in Paz del B.!.o put a
n can also be dete cted in 1971 - 72.
ic:lpa ct of the star t of autom otive prod uctio
effic ient meta l-me chan ic
Thro ugho ut, less drru. iatic and prob ably more
shar e of dcm estic ally procl uccd
indu strie s have also lwlp ed to expa.--id the
mach inery and equip ;ncnt .
es in the late 1950 s, the
Afte r the coll.: tpBe of doll ar coff ee pric
s inve stme nt in mach inery and
cons tant- price shar e of GNP devo ted to gros
ent durin g 1950 throu gh 1956 , to
equip ment feil from an aver age of 12.6 perc
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__

Table VIII-5

______________

Share of Im-oorts in Gross Inves t.r::icn t in Hachinerv
___,
e.ad Fqt:i-ct:;:2nt. :i.ncl...:.,!in'! 'l'r<',,i;nort:

(Percentar;es; original mar;nitudcs at constant 1958 prices)

1950-54

93.7

1955-56

93.6

1957-58

84.8

1959-62

82. 7

1963-66

76.2

1967-70

73.4

1971-72

67.8

Sources ,m<l r.1ethod:

National Accounts, BdlR.
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7. 7 percent durini 195 7 through 1969.

Only during 1970 through 1972

has that: share risen in a sustained but tn1spcctacular manner to an average
of 8. 3 percent of G:{P.

While no detailed data are available on investment

allocation, it is known that the 1950s witnessed considerable investment in
social ov.:;rhead capital and other projects quite intensive in inported
machinery and cquipr.,c.nt; examples include the already-mention ed steel mill
and the Atlantic railroad.

Thus, the drop in ~he GNP share devoted to gross

investment in machinery and equipment reflects exo~enous changes in investment allocation as well as halo.nee of payments strinicncy.
It may be seen in Table VIII-6 that investment in construction, while
showing considerable year-to-year fluctuations smoothed in the table, behaved
more stably than machinery and equipment capital formation; its direct and
indirect import c0t:1ponen.t is much lower than that of the latter category.
Note that all percentages presented in Table VIII-6 have been ccxnputed frcn
data expressed at constant 1958 prices.

It is instructive to ccmpare these

numbers with those in Table VIII-7, showing CD.pital formation and its
financing also as GNP shares. but with magnitudes originally in current
prices.

While Table VIII-6 shows 1950-56 investnent ratios exceeding those

ca.iing later, Table VIII-7 shoHs the opposite.
At an accounting level, the discrepancy is mostly explained by the
evolution of the implicit prices of machinery and transport equipment,
relative to the GNP deflator.

As shown in Table VIII-8, a remarkable rise

in the relative prices of those capital goods occurred after 1955-56; given
Colombian dependence on imports of those goods, such a rise can be traced
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Tab le VIII -6

Gros s Can ital Form atio n. 1950 -72
(Per cent ages of G~P at mark ec pric es;
es)
orig inal mag nitu des at con stan t 1958 pric
Gro ss Cap ital
F'o:-.r..'ation

Bui ldin gs,
othe r Con stru ctio n
and I~ur ovcm ents

Nac hine ry and
othe r Equ ipme nt

Net Change
in Inve nt.o ric:,

22.3

9.3

12.0

1.1

1950 -54

25.7

10.9

14.2

0.6

1955 -56

20.8

10.0

7.1

3.7

1957 -58

20.2

9.8

8.3

2.1

1959 -62

19.2

8.6

7.8

2.8

1963 -66

19.3

10.3

7.3

1.6

1967 -70

20.7

10.1

8.3

2. Li

1971 -72

Sou rce n,d n~e thod :

An in Tab le VII I-5.
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Table VIII-7

Financing of Gross Cai;:,ital Formation, 1950-72
(Percentage s of G{,P at market prices;
original magnitudes at current prices)

Gross Capital

Private

Formation

Savings

Public
Sav:ings

Net Capital

Inflow

1950-54

16.1

11.9

4.1

1955-56

18.2

12.0

4.5

1.7

1957-58

19.6

15. 7

4.6

-0.7

1959-62

19.9

14.9

3.8

1.2

1963-66

18.8

12.6

3.4

2.8

1967-70

20.9

12.0

6.1

2.8

1971-72

22.1

12.4

5.1

4.6

Sources and method:

As in Table VIII-5.
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Table VIII-8
1950-72
Imnlicit Price Deflators for Gross I:1",•3tc1ent,
___
··---~·-.._.__
(Divided over implicit price <leilator for G:.1 1 at 1:·,.:n-Ket prices; 1958=100)

Buildings,
other Construction
and Imn rovc::1en ts

Transport
Equipment

Hachinery
and other
Equipment

Imported
Machinery and
Eauipment

1950-54

97.9

54. 7

49.8

47.7

1955-56

96.0

51.8

50.3

48.1

1957-58

97.3

87.4

85.7

84.2

1959-62

110.8

81.9

89.7

85.0

1963-66

118.2

76.2

84.5

80.1

1967-70

117.0

92.6

101.2

101.6

1971-72

117 .o

99.8

99.l

106.0

Sou re.es and method:

As in Table VIII-5.
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back to a similar increase_in the real ioport exchange rate, as can be
16 After
seen ccc1paring the last colur:in of Table VIII-8 and Table IV-s.
peaking in 1958, both relative prices fell~ until new devaluations and
the crawling peg raised tlwr.1 back to around 1953 levels durin3 the late 1960s
and early 1970s.
The economic explanation for the sharp rise in the relative prices
of machinery and equipment during 1957 and 1958, and their high levels
thereafter, was the deterioration in the balance of payments first trigger
ed by the collapse of dollar coffee prices.

Such worsening of Colombian

tenns of trade meant a loss in the effectiveness of the mechanism throur,h
which the country transformed its savings into tangible raachinery and
equipment.

Coffeet at that time the indirect but oajor provider of non

construction capital ~oo<ls, suffered nn exogenous drop in dollar prices,
equivalent to a productivity less in rnisin/j the relative prices of rr.. achincry and equipment.

'

A similar phenomenon has been recorded for another

Latin American country, but for an earlier period.

17

An increase in the

real exchange rate for imports as well as for non-traditiona l exports may
thus be viewed as a way to offset the decline in efficiency of the tradition
al indirect way of obtaining machinery and equipment, by rationing available
foreign exchanr:e r.10rc stringently, in the short run, and by encouraging
new direct and indirect sources of machinery and equipment, in the long
run.

While the real evolution of capital formation is best measured at con
stant prices, the burdens involved in achieving a given savings rate should
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be measured at current prices, as in Table VIII-7.

In an aggregate , ~ 

post sense, it cnn be seen that the demand for all investmen t goods vas
shown to be inelastic by the pos t-1956 increase in relative prices ;1

8

a

larger share of GNP was saved domestica lly (except during 1963-66) after
the rise in capital goods relative prices than during 1950-56.

The

paradm~ic a.l increase in national savings at a time of severe balance of
payments and growth crisis during 1957-58 is astonishi ng.

It is noteworth y

that national savings durine the prosperou s years of 1971-72 stood at 17.5
percent of GNP, substanti ally below the 20.3 percent rate achieved during
the "blood, s,,eat and tears" years of 1957 and 1958.

Contrasti ng all of

1967 through 1972 with 1950 through 1956, the saving rates and capital
inflow emcq;e as follows:

1950-56

1967-72

12.0%

12.1%

Public savings

4.2

5.8

Net capital inflow

0.4

3.4

16.7%

21.3%

Private savings

Gross car._ital_J ormation

Increases in the rates of public savinB and capital inflow account for
about all of the increase in the current-p rices rate of capital accumula tion.
Even allowing for possible changes i'Il the structure of investmen t
allocatio n, it would be difficult to credit the 1967-72 accelerat ion in GNP
growth on a higher rate of capital formation .

Assuming a one-year average

eestation period for. invcst~en ts, and comparing constant- price rates of
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gross capital formation with CUP growth rates, one obtains the following
marginal capital-out put ratios (MCORs):
1951 through 1955:

4.08

1956 through 1967:

4.81

1968 through 1972:

3.22

The sharp drop in HCORs between 1956-67 and 1968-72 contrasts with the
more sluggish evolution of the aggregate investment rate, as follows:
1950 through 1954:

22.3%

1955 through 1966:

20.9

1967 through 1971:

19.7

One may speculate as to sources for the low MCOR during 1968-72.
Earlier years had witnessed not only severe import restriction s on imports
of capital goods, but also erratic stop-go fiscal and tionetary policies, with
expansion~r y bin~es being followed by restrictive policies.

Austerity

in fiscal and monetary matters, when applied, did help the balance of payments,
but at the cost of slowing GNP expansion, and generating excess capacity
even in sectors whose direct and indirect demand for imported inputs was
small.

Excess capacity during 1956 through 1967 was due not so much to a

lack of key faported inputs paralyzing whole factories, but to fiscal and
monetary policies ,,Thich could not afford to be steadily expansionar y for
fear, a well-founde d fez.r, of leading. to balance of payments problems.
Selective measures allowing differentia l expansion depending on import
intensity were difficult to irnpleracnt beyond gross aggregation levels.
As the balance of payments situation improved after 1967

and support

ed by the crawling peg, fiscal and monetary policy could avoid the violence
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of previo us stop-s o spasm s.

But by 1972-7 4, furthe r encour aged by boomin 8

y, in the
world <le=iand, oacro polici es may have become overly expan sionar
sense that they could not be sustai ned.

At any rate, since 1967 excess

import ed
capac ity was steadi ly put to use, wheth er or not it relied on
inputs .

less
Thus, new expor ts at one end tapped resour ces which had been

expan sive
than fully used before , in a "vent- for-su rplus" fashio n, while
portin g activ iaggreg ate domes tic demand had a simila r effec t on all non-ex
h
1
.
f ore1.gn
. .
\.
T.T •
•
ge eai::ni• ngs, 19 h oweve r, sue a
exc.1an
t t h e r1.s1.ng
,~1.t11ou
ties.
scena rio would not have been possib le.

In other words , given the exogen ous

incon sisten t,
dollar coffee price, the impli cit 1956-6 7 "plan" was intern ally
rate of, say,
althou gh contai ning static ineffi cienc ies, such as a GNP growth
gs, which could
six percen t per annum requir ing higher foreig n exchan ge earnin
bian param eters.
not be replac ed by impor t-subs titutio n polici es, given Colom
an
The higher and steadi er post-1 967 growth oust have encour aged
the stop-g o
invest ment proces s more effici ent than that undert aken under
gyrati ons of earlie r years.

How much this contri buted to loweri ng the

HCOR, howev er, is a moot point.
since
It is likely that to sustai n the GNP growth rates regist ered
that _in
1967, the consta nt-pri ce invest ment coeff icient , partic ularly
rate, its
rnachi nery and equipm ent, will have to contin ue, and at a faster
upward climb.
neck, i~e.

s


Tht: long run benef it of breaki ng the foreig n exchan ge bottle

r
allot;i ng a larger inflow of i..-nportcd capita l goods and a highe

2, when the
invest: I:lent rate, will then become oore visibl e than during 1967-7
short- run benef its dt!scri bcd above predom inated .

Compared with earlie r
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years, Colombia now has a more diversified base for capital formation.

Its

indirect sources of machinery and equipment, e.g., exports, as well as
its own direct output of those goods,look sturdier than in, say, 1956.
Hopefully, an exogenous shock, such as the 1957-58 one, will not come
around to test such sturdiness.

It may be added that a more general diver

sification in the Colombian productive structure, and thus a greater
capacity to transform, makes policy tools potentially more effective in
handling possible exogenous shocks, and in mai_ntaining both balance of
payments and macroeconomic equilibrium.
In discussing the links betwe.en trade policies and growth, this section
has dealt e.xclusively with variations on the foreign-exchanne gap model, and
with short-medium-term macroeconomic management, an approach which some
may find overly "Keynesian."

While emphasizing the importance of these

effects for the Colombinn case, the author does not intend to deny the
existence of possible links between trade policies and other dynamic effects
influencing growth over the long run.
is scanty.

Leonard Dudley,
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But hard evidence on these matters

in a study of 25 import-substituting industries

in the Colombian metal products sector during 1959-66, found important
learning effects, explaining half of substantial productivity gains,
particularly in casting, forsing and stamping.

Whether or not import sub

stituting activities generate larger learning effects than exporting ones,
however, is a moot point.

Colcmbia offers anecdotal evidence showing that

some forms (e.c., in textiles) are remarkably X-efficicnt nnd innovative
whether they devote ther.iselvcs to import-substitution or to exporting, as are
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Germans with alternative socioeconomic systems.·

It will be recalled

froci Chapter VI that, as of 1971, major exporting firms still relied
heavily on domestic sales.

When the exporting experience becomes lon~er,

and more differentiated from domestic sales, greater possibilities for
exploring contrasts in behavior bet-ween exporting and import-substituting
firms may become possible.

Trade Policies~ Incone Distribution and Employment
The use of one policy instrument, or a cluster of closely related ones,
may bring a comnunity closer to achieving several policy targets simultan
eously.

Such happy circumstances, however, are rare.

In the recent upsurge

of export optimism in Colombia, as well as in other developing countries,
there has been a tendency to suppose that switching from policies emphasizing
import substitution to those giving greater incentives to exports will
not only promote efficiency and growth, but will also significantly in.prove
income distribution and accelerate the growth of employment in modem (or
"truly productive") activities.

This supposition is usually based not just

on the observation that important controls mechanisms associated with
import substitution benefit disproportionally the powerful .:ind rich, but
also rests on appeals to a two-factor version of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem, featuring for developing countries plentiful labor and scarce capi
tal, with or without downward wage rigidity.

How much of an improvement in

income distribution or employment one can expect from export-promoting
policies, however, is usually not specified.
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Earlier chapters have argued that Colombian :ir.:port controls and the
protective system in general do appear to have biases strengtheni ng income
inequality, regional disparities and industrial concentrati on.

The pro

tective system has also encouraged a large number of capital-inte nsive
projects.

Nevertheles s, it should be emphasized that elimination of import

controls would still leave a multitude of similar mechanisms through which
the rich and powerful could take advantage of state power to buttress and further
. .

.

t h eir position.
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Imperfectio ns.in domestic capital markets, to give one

fashionable example, loom as large a source of inequality as import con
trols.

Thus, focusing just on the protective system can give a misleading

impression of the true sources of inequality, confusing a sympton for the
root of the disease.
Earlier chapters have also presented evidence on the characteris tics
of the new Colonbian minor exports.

Such limited data suggest that, at the

very least, one would want to expand the usual two-by-two Hecksher-O hlin
trade model to a three-by-th ree one, to analyze the impact of trade policies
on income distributio n and employment.

On

the input side, land or natural

resources must be ~dded to labor and capital, while non-tradeab le goods
(or the subsistence sector) must be added to import ables and exportables .
In the expa,,ded oodel, application s of the Stolper-San uelson theorem will
bec01-:1e more difficult and acl-lwc.

But more fundill-.-ienta lly, it was seen

earlier that the emerEing trade pattern of Colombia cannot be explained only
by a simple or expanded Heckscher-O hlin oodel.

Even leaving aside "unusual"

trade flows probably induced by dor.iestic policies, such as Colombian trade
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with other mer.1bers of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAITA),
other trade theories, such as vent-for-surplu s, the product cycle, and those
emphasizing loc;.ition, are helpful in explaining bits and pieces of
Colombian foreir;n. trade.

The implications of those positive trade theories

for functional income distribution, much less for far.iily income distribution
or for the income of the poorest half of the population, have not been ex
plored systematically in the literature,

or empirically.

either theoretically

If a given export-expansio n can be explained with a vent-for-surplu s

Who gets

model, the name of the distributional gaine will be pure rents.
them depends on who owns the rent-yielding assets.

If such assets are

relatively homogeneous and compact in location, they can be grouped under
one label, "land:" and a Heckscher-Ohlin model could be good enough to explore
links between traclc and distribution, as in the Argentine case.

In Colombia 5

those assets· are less homor,ene.ous, ranging from sur,ar land in the Cauca
Valley to mineral deposits scattered over the whole country.

One crop or

mineral I:lay be a heavy user of labor inputs, but others may not, depending
on the technological characteristics of the production functions of the
different staples, and the socioeconomic conditions in the region.

Neverthe

less, the 1972/73 boom in dollar prices of minor rural exports has high
lighted one Arr:cntine-like. way of viewing a mechanism linkin8 greater
openness of the ccono,ay with a worsening of income distribution:

as those

exportable goods bid up land prices, foodstuffs grown for domestic con
sunption, usinc somewhat similar land, also saw their prices rise, ahead
of money wages in many cases.
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For exports of manufactured products, the product cycle theory emphasizes
whether a commodity is technologically new or old and standardized; whether
it is labor- or capital-intensive is of secondary importance.

The cement

exported from the Colombian Atlantic coast, for example,is a standardized
good, benefiting

in that case also from location advantar,es; its capital

intensity is not a major barrier in competing in the Caribbean area.

Flat

glass is also exported from Medellin, in spite of both capital-intensity
and location· disadvantages.
A switch, speaking in relative ten.is, from import substitution to

export prcmotion could improve income distribution in countries such as
Colombia, or could worsen it.

And the change attributable to trade policies

could be quantitatively important, or negligible.

No simple model could give

us answers to these alternatives, and the detailed information needed for
confident projections is not available.

Much of the same can be said regard

ing the possible impact on employment, although there is reason.
optimistic here, at least for the urban sector.

to be more

While the link between trade

policies and income distribution has much to do with the structure of the
import-competing~• that of the exporting sector, and relatively little with
the overall growth rate, one may conjecture that the opposite is likely to
be the. case for urban employ-J1ent.

The impact of different growth rates on

income distribution, ceteris narihus, is ambiguous, but is almost surely
positive regarding urban employr.ient.

Even if one fears that import liberaliza

tion may destroy labor-intensive handicrafts, without compensating expansion
in ;Labor-intensive exports, a higher GNP growth rate made possible by the
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relaxatio n of the foreign exchange bottlenec k is likely to have a net posi
tive impact on urban employ:nen t creation.

Over the longer run, of course,

this could feed buck positivel y on income distribut ion.

The picture for

rural e1:1.ployment is more complex, and much depends on what incentive s are
generated for changes in land tenure, and on the robustnes s of the sub
sistence sector ..
To clarify these uncertain ties, one would like to have for marginal import
competinr; and exportinr; activitie s direct and indirect input requireme nts of
such thinr;s as.natura l resources , unskilled and other labor, imported
machinery and equipmen t, and other capital goods.

Disaggreg ation of activi

ties would clearly have to go beyond that in the available Colombian input
output table, which has one row and column for the whole rural sector.

Hope

fully, one would then be able to compare, for example, the direct and indirect
factor use of refined sugar with that of "refined cotton," i.e., textiles,
which now are excessive ly dichoto.'ni zed as exports of primary products vs.
exports of manufact ures.
But even at the level of first round or direct effects,a dditiona l
informati on, not found even in quite disaggreg ated input-out put tables, appears
necessary to predict factor use.

As noted earlier, factor proportio ns in

a given Colombian industry differ markedly by firm size.

It thus becomes

important to knc\, whether large or small firms are carrying out marginal
import-su bstitution or exporting .

It is also relevant to investiga te

whether, as it se~ns likely on average, large firms have a larger participa 
tion in tradeable p,oods (both exportabl es and importabl es) than in the sector
producing non-trade able goods and services.

Some i<lea of the variabili ty
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in factor use according to size of firm in the Colombian manufactu ring
sector is given in Table VIII-9, on the assumptio n that differenc es in
average labor productiv ity reflect, at least partly, differenc es in factor
use.

This table indicates , for example, that the variation in the averaee

productiv ity of firms employing between SO and 100 persons, across the standard
industria l classific ations, is not so different from the variation in average
labor productiv ity of firms producin2 paper and paper products,
but having different size.

The table also suggests how little informati on

one eains about factor use from knowing that a given firm produces tobacco or
rubber products, without specifyin g size of firm.

How much of this variabil

ity is due to heterogen ous output under the standard industria l classific aitms, and how much is due to differenc es in factor use in the productio n of

"identica l" goods is another moot point, given available. data.

Only finer

disaggreg ation according both to output and size can settle that issue.
Similar considera tions could be made regarding the rural sector, for which
Albert Berry has c.locur,-.ented substanti al differenc es in land productiv ity accord.

1.ng

22
.
to f arm size.

Important distinctio ns in factor use exist especiall y

between small subsisten ce farms, and large commercia l ones.
During a transitio n period between policies emphasizi ng import substitu
tion and those promoting exports, as 1967-72 undoubted ly was, most exportinf,
fims also sold substant ially, and predo~ina ntly. to the domestic market.
As late as 1973, a group of large firms accountin g for 42 percent of register
ed manufactu red exports of that year, were reported to have sold 90.8 percent
23
As many of these firms have used
of their output in the doraestic market.
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Table VIII-9
Value Added Per Esrloyed Person in Col0t:1bian Manufactu rinr-: 1 1967

Accor-C.ir;~ to si.~c

1- 14
15- 19
20- 49
50- 99
100-199
200 and

(')~

(a)
Average
(Thousand
1967 Pesos)

(b)
Standard
Deviation

29.1
38.1
42.1
47.0
64.6
81.3

18.4
47.7
34.6
28.1
48.5
79.3

0.63
1.25
o. 82
0.60
0.75
0.98

25
24
25
25
25
24

63.0

. 58.6

0.93

25

59.6
94.8
91.0
32.5
22.9
35.3
68.9
19.6
75.6
17.5
28. 9

18.1

o. 30

6

58.4
132.8
8.6
6.1
16.1
33.1
. 6.1
88.7
6.2
10.0
11.9
25.0
6.6
25.2

0.62
1.46
0.26
0.27
0.46
0.48
0.31
1.17
0.35
0.35
0.27
0.67
0.28

a.so

6
6

15.7

0.46

6

34.0
98.7
15.8
22.5
13.4
6.1
20.6
8.1

0.39
0.62

0.29
0.40

11.6

0.28

6
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

20.1

0.43

6

(b) Divided
bv (a)

Number of
Cate~orie s

fjr.:

persons
persons
persons
persons
persons
over persons

Tot2ls for each industria l
classific ation

-

Accordin1 to inoustria l
classific aticn:

Food
lleverDges
Tobacco products
Tc;:tilcs
Clothini and footwear
Printing and publishin g
Phnrm.:i.c euticals & related products
Furnit,\r-e and fixtures
Rubber products
Cera.'::ic proJucts
Non-elec trical appliance s
Electrica l 2ppliauce s
Hotor vehicles
Wood c1:1d proc.lucts
Paper c1nd products
Leather and products
Chemicals otber than pharr..ace uticals
Petroleum and coal products
Non-met~ llic oineral products
Basic metal products
Hetal products
Mechanica l machinery
Electrica l r.1achincry , except appliance s
Transport equipment
Other
Total 1nanufact uring accordin~ to
firn size

44.2
3 7.2
23.5
50.6
34.2
88.2
158.7
31.2
77 .2
33~ 7

30.6
43.6
30.3
40.8
46.3

o.s1
0.20

0.47
0.27

6
6
6
6
6
'6
6
6
6
5
6

6

.'.l.nd
Sources end r.:ct.ho<l: Basic data obtained from Internati onal Bank for Reconstru ction
1970,
1,
Novemher
,
Pro•~nccts
and
Ucvc.1opr,, ~nt, ~i~.\:.'.'.-'.~::ic CrC'~~·th cJf Col_cd)i:·,: ?ct,bh•;·•::;
Voll.:."'le. IV, ,\:,pd,c i~~ 1, 'Lil.lie 11. lt [:i,c,11,i b~ nCJte:<l ti1at the averages shown for eaci,
fin1 size c.:i.tc';>;cry or industria l cla!;sific :.tion caterory are the unweighte d averages
they
obtain.:cd trc.:1 the relcv ,mt s uiigroups, ,:hicb already involve some averagin;' .. Thus,
VlII-3.
can be expected to differ fro;:i the (more exact) avera8CS shown in Table
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underutilized capacity to produce exports, a given export expansion may have
a widely varying first-round iopact on factor use depending on whether one
deals with the short or the long run, and on assUillptions about firm behavior.
Putting to use excess installed capacity for sales abroad could involve a
marginal capital use per unit of output much lower in the short than in the
long run.

As the export drive becomes consolidated, and contrary to what

is likely to happen in import substitution, new smaller finns may plun8e
into exporting, once the

larger firms have shown that Colombian output can

compete internationally, and establish

exporting infrastructure.

Or

smaller finns may become associated with larger exporting firms in increas
ing m..nnbers as subcontractors (an evolution which has also occurred in the
import competing sector).

In short, the factor use observed during the ea::-ly

stages for an export drive may be significantly different from that observed
at more mature stages of export expansion, in a pattern different fron that
observed during import substitution.
The calculation of indirect effects on factor demands, and other general
equilibrium effects, are also difficult to trace out with accuracy.

The

canplementary or indirect services required by different types of export
and import substitutin~ activities could vary substantially.

For example,

the export of a staple like coal will need complementary capital-intensive
services, such as transportation by r1'.l.ilroads or trucks to take the stuff
to harbors, quite different from the needs of carnation exports, or those
generated in duty-free zones.
It was noted in Chapter I that Berry and Urrutia have shown that as of
mid-1960s the distribution of Colombian

personal income was highly unequal;
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in their calcula tions for 1964, the Gini coeffic ient was 0.57.

24

They


find that a period of worsen ing distrib ution began in the 1930s and continu
urban and
ed until around the r.1id-19 50s, not only overal l, but in both
rural sectors .

From the mid-19 50s until the mid-19 60s, the evidenc e they


examin ed sugges ts an improve ment in urban distrib ution, a continu ed worsen
ement.
ing of the distrib ution in agricu lture, with a modera te overal l improv
of
They add that there is some tentati ve evidenc e that the latest episode
deterio 
fast growth , between 1967 and 1973; may have been charac terized by a
Some of this

ration in the positio n of the urban employed worker s at least.

r.
effect may have been compen sated by a decreas e in unempl oyment , howeve
in the
They conclud e that the challen ge now facins Colomb ia is how to avoid
future an increas e in inequa lity as econan ic growth accele rates.
Changes in the labor share in GDP provide a crude, but availab le, index
of change s in income diGtrib ution.

It may be seen in Table VIII-10 that

shed,
1971-7 2, by which time the post-19 67 policie s had become well establi
cturwitness ed either an end or a revers al of the upward trend in the manufa
ing and overal l wage shares which had started after 1955-5 8.

The plunge

than
in the rural wage share ougges ts that new comme rcial crops use less labor
the old staple, coffee , and than the subsist ence sector .

By 1972, the wage

manufa ctur
share was 26.5 percen t in agricu lture and livesto ck, 40.2 percen t in
ing and 39.4 percen t for the whole GDP.
25
sugges ts that op~n unempl oyment rates in the
Scatter ed eviden ce
ever
four larges t Colomb ian cities peaked in 1967, and have been declini ng
since.

As in other develop ing countr ies, howeve r, the openly unempl oyed in
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Table VIII-10
Labor Share in GDP
(Percentages)

Agriculture
and Livestock

Manufacturing

1950-54

35.9

29.2

73.5

18.3

36.4

35.9

1955-58

31.3

33.5

71.9

18.3

36.9

35.7

1959-62

32.1

35.6

71.8

18.6

44.0

37. 4

1963-66

33.2

37.6

74. 4 -

18.3

47.8

39.3

1967-70

30.9

40.2

79.4

21.0

45. 3

40.4

1971-72

27.6

40.7

77. 3

17.l

47.0

40.1

Sources and method:

Construction

Commerce

Transr,ort

GDP

National accounts of the BdlR. Percentages were cooputed
usinB data at current prices and measured at factor cost.
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Colombi a are typicall y young people, non-head s of families and others who
can afford to be openly employe d.

Those at the bottom of the income scale

usually have some kind of employm ent, and there is no evidenc e on whether
demand for their services has expanded substan tially since 196 7.
Both a priori

conside rations and availab le post-196 7 evidenc e cast

doubt as to whether further import liberali zation, by itself, will signifi 
cantly alter Colombia n incor.1e distribu tion and enployn ent patterns ~

It is

particu larly doubtfu l that furthE..r import liberali zation would do much for
or against the bottom half of the income scale, say, during the next ten
years or so.

Indeed, it is conceiv able that further encourag ement of modem

mechani zed rural activiti es oriented toward foreign markets could further
tla;uage the possibi lities of landless farmers and minifun distas for obtain
ing family-s ized farms.

It should be recalled that still about 45 percent

of the Colombi an active populati on is engaged in rural activit ies, and that
a good share of the poorest part of the nation is to be found there.

Unless

other policies are adopted, the encourag ement of commerc ial outward -oriente d
farming could worsen land and income distribu tion in the country side, and
by absorbin g parts of the subsiste nce sector, it could actually generate
disguise d rural or urban unemplo yment.

It would not be the first time in

history that such a thing happens .

Trade and Financi al Policie s, and the De~ree of Nationa l Autonomy
While income distribu tion and employm ent data are scarce, at least the
concept s involved are, in princip le, quantif iable.

"Nation al autonom y" is
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a vaguer concept, but of no lesser importance for those responsible for
frmning international trade and financial policies in Colombia (and else
where).

As measured by the proportion of imports of goods and services in

GDP, the openness of the Colombian econany rose from 13.0 percent during 196366, to 14.0 percent during 1967-70 and to 15.6 percent in 1971-72. 26

Has

this trend been accompanied by a significant change in the degree of control
of Colombians over their own economy?

What will be the impact of further

liberalization and openness on such control?
The post-1967 expansion of exports has been characterized not only by
a remarkable diversification in the goods exported, but also by a continu
ation of diversification of geographical trade partners, also noticed for
imports.

The extent of the geographical diversification may be

seen in

Tables III-8 and IV-10. It was also noted earlier, in Chapters II and VI,
that the participation of foreign-owned enterprises in minor exports, while
important, particularly for manufactured products, is less than that of
domestic firms.

It would indeed be dangerous for the political viability

of export pronotion if the production or merchandising of new exports fell
predominantly under the control of foreign enterprise.

Dissatisfaction

with protectionist policies was boosted as a greater share of finns in the
cutting edge of import substitution turned out to be foreign owned.
Vulnerability to external cycles and pressures has been reduced not
only by geographical and product diversification• but also by the establish
ment of preferential arrangements with countries at a similar stage of devel
opment.

The Andean common market may be viewed partly as insurance against

a collapse of world markets; if such an event occurs, import substitution
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se of expor t
at the Andean level could go into high gear to offse t the collap
drives .

a
Had Latin Americ a had such arrang ement s in 1929• the indus trializ

ent.
tion of the 1930s and 1940s would have been faster and more effici
l
Trade is only one aspect of Colorabian links with the intern ationa
with larger
economy, and trade libera lizati on will typica lly be accom panied
and

flows, in and out, of capita l

specia l servic es, such as techno logy.

and capita l are
A case can be made that intern ationa l marke ts for techno logy
posing a
less divers ified and compe titive than those fo.r most goods, thus
y on them
poten tial threat to the autonomy of count ries relyin g too heavil
withou t defens ive mecha nisms.
to obtain better bargai ns.

Such mecha nisms, of course , can also be used

For these reason s, it sec.ms wise for Colom bia

er of
to retain presen t contro ls and regist ration proced ures for transf
ments , even
techno logy and capita l flows, partic ularly direct foreig n invest
as it moves to elimin ate import contro ls.

In some cases, the greate r com

foreig n owned ,
petiti ve pressu res put on import compe ting firms, many of them
rates, will
by the elimin ation of import contro ls, plus realis tic exchan ge
as overin voicin g
reduce the import ance of keepin g detail ed tabs on such matte rs
of import ed inputs and fake royalt y payme nts abroad .

This should allow a

oly power
greate r effici ency of contro ls over transa ctions involv ing monop
oly power
origin ating abroad , rather than wastin g effort dealin g with monop
create d by misgu ided domes tic protec tionis m.
that exces sive
Both capita l and techno logica l inflow s raise the possi bility
the capab ility
relian ce on foreig ners will weaken local effor ts, and reduce
of Colom bia for long run autono mous develo pment .

1be flabby perfor mance of

growth and
recent Colora bian privat e and public saving s, at a time of fast
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substantial capital inflow,

documented earlier in this chapter, shows

that such a preoccupation is not misplaced, even if it is difficult to say
much oore on the subject, for a single country.
More, however, can be said on different types of capital flows.

Non

concessional long term capital is now available to Colombia mainly in two
forms:
debt.

as direct foreign investment (DFI), and as sales abroad of Colombian
The former type, as is well known, comes as a package of technology,

management, marketing and capital; often the last component is small, and
the first a doubtful substantive contribution.

The °'~e Decree-Law 444 of

1967, which set up the framework.for a crawling peg and export promotion,
established firm controls over DFI, later reflected in the celebrated
Resolution 24 of the Andean group.

The hysterics of the international

financial press notwithstanding, DFI has continued flowing into Colombia.
Indeed, and somewhat disappointingly, the allocation pattern of such invest
ment since 1967 has not been very different from that before.

It may be

seen in Table VIII-11 that cheoicals, refineries, rubber and plastics,
heavily oriented toward ir..port substitution, have continued attracting about
one-third of DFI,

The sane source given in that table indicates little

change in the geographical source of DFI; the United States still accounts
for about half, with the shares for Switzerland, France, Japan and the Feder
al Republic of Gernany shot,:ini:; an increane after 196 7.
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As with other scmi-industrinlized and/or resource-rich developing countries,
Colot'1hia has discovered durinp, the early 1970s that it could obtain sub
stantial sums fr001 "arms-len13th" world capital markets.

During 1973, for
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Table VIII-11
Accumulated D:ircct Forci~ Invcstf!lent in Colonbia
(Percentages of total)

Before
January 1,

1967

Januarv
. 1,
196 7 through
December 31, 197Z

Foodstuffs, bever.a.gcs and tobacco

6.8

3. 7

Textiles, clothing and leather products

4.0

3.8

Wood products and furniture

0.3

4.1

8.9

2.7

31.8

33.3

Non-metallic minerals

5.1

2.6

Basic metals

1.6

1.2

11.3

12. 7

0.6

0.4

70.3

64.4

Fina11c;;c!~ insurance, real .estate and related services

11.4

24.4

Co;n:ne.rcc, hotels Jnd restatn·.:1nts

11.4

6.5

Mining (except petroleum)

2.7

1.4

Transport and co~,nunications

2.4

o.8

Agriculture, livestock and fishing

0.9

0.9

All other

0.8

1.6

100.0

100.0

$429.1

$111.0

Paper,

printing and publishing

Chemicals, refineries, rubber and plastics

Hetallic products, machinery and equipment
Other manufacturing

All manufacturing

Total
Total value, million U.S. $

Sources ,,,ad ncthod:

BdlR, Infor::w ••• , 1972, page 122.

Data re.fer to the registered

and accu:-.J.'.llated value of investments, except those in petroleum.

Registered value underestimates the value of assets owned and
controlled by foreign investors.
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example, Colombia was reported to have borrowed $170 million in the eurocurrency market.
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This source of funds, although expensive, provides a

hea1t:1y alternative to both DFI and the more traditional forms of borrowing
from multilateral intermediaries , such as the IBRD and the IADB, as well as
to concessional bilateral finance •. Borrowing from the euro-currency market,
as well as from other foreign capital markets, carries costs and risks not
associated with borrowing from the IBRD and the IADB, but also involves
less sacrifice of national control over investment decisions.

As any fonn

of foreign borrowing, of course, it bears careful control, both at the level
of individual loans and as to aggregates.
As measured by the traditional indicator, e.g., service payments on
the whole e.xternal public debt as a percentage of exports of goods and non
factor services, the Colombian debt burden rem~ins moderate.

It stood at

15.5 percent in 1965-66, at 12.8 percent in 1967-70, and at 13.8 percent in
1971.

29

So long as minor exports maintain their dynamism, the Colombian

capacity to borrow in private markets looks quite good, potentially strenr,then
ing the position of the country vis-A-vis multilateral intermediaries and
bilateral donors (if any).
On the whole, it is doubtful that the gradual post-1967 liberalization
trenc.1 has substantially changed Colombia's capacity for autonomous decision
making; on balance, the net change seer.1s to be, if anything, toward greater
effective national control over the domestic econony.

Aided also by trends

in the world econor:1y, policy r.iakers are able to consider more options than
they could realistically . face, say, around 1965.

On the other hand, the
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greater openness of the economy demands a more careful coordinatio n of
different policy tools, such as monetary, fiscal and exchan3e rate policies,
than was necessary when both Colombia and the Atlantic world had less
complex and interrelated econoraies, as during the 1950s.

Some Final P.emarks
The gradualist trade and payments policies followed since 1967 have
impressive achievement s to their credit.

By placinB balance of payments

manageoent on a routine basis, they have permitted a more efficient

and

faster overall growth rate, which appeared out of reach during 1957-66.
A remarkable expansion of exports, aided by a booming world economy has
confounded export pessifilists.

The relaxation of the foreign exchange

bottleneck, 'and the removal of periodic exchange crises from the front par,es,
have given policy makers the option of turning their attention to the really
serious problems in the Colombian economy, e.g., poverty, under.employ ment,
incorJe distributio n and national autono:ny, areas in which the impact of
trade and payments policies is indirect and weak, or even neiative.
Further import liberalizat ion, beyond the star,e reached in i;iid-1974,
and a tidying-up of the export promotion system could, if properly managed,
consolidate and slightly expand the post-196 7 gains in efficiency and growth.
Other rcforr.i.s, however, are likely to have now a larger pay off, particularl y
in the area of incone distributio n; those would include a profound tax refom, includin7, stiffer land taxes,

expansion of public expenditure s in

education and health, and a liberalizat ion of the dauestic capital r.1arket,
either by giving a greater role to market-infl uenced interest rates

or by
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"as-if" lendine and borrowing policies of a nationalized banking and financial
system.

The relaxation of the foreign exchanie constraint has focused

attention once again on the need to expand local,private and public savings
if the overall growth rate is to be increased, or even maintained, as the
marginal capital output ratio registered in recent years is unlikely to
A less distorted internal cap1tal market may help somewhat in

persist.
this area.

While avoidable balance of payments crises have not distracted policy
makers in recent years, a similar "red herring" has re-emerged, especially
during 1973 and 1974.

It appears that during these years overly expansionary

fiscal and monetary policies, including financial reforms boosting construction,
led to an overheating of the economy which, coupled with exogenous increases
in the world dollar price level, resulted in inflation rates not seen in
Colombia for several years.

Such inflation has, inter alia, endangered the

crawling peg policy, undertaken since 196 7 amidst declining inflationary
rates.

The policy maker, in particular the new reformist administration

inaugurated August 1974, is forced to give first priority to a macroeconomic
management problem without positive long run structural effects, but which
if left unattended could have severe negative consequences.
In retrospect, the Colombian experience vindicates the case for gradualism
in import liberalization, which went pari passu with export expansion.

It

was not necessary to dismantle the protective system before that export
expansion could be generated.

The wisdom of avoiding shock treatments while

keeping control over macroeconomic management policies remains relevant for
anti-inflationary policies.

VIII-53

Footnotes to Chanter VIII

1

These growth or decline rates refer to those obtained by fitting

trend lines, as in Tables I-1 and 1-2.
2

Table I-2 shows GDP growth rates only for 1950 through 1956 and for

1967 through 1972.

Prelimina ry statistic s indicate a GDP growth rate of

7.0 percent for 1973.
1974, p. 5.

See Coyuntura Econcmica t Volume IV, No. 1, April

UNECLA estimates place the GDP annual growth rate at 5.2

percent during 1945-50, and at 4.2 percent for just 1947-50.

The UNECLA

estimates can be found in DANE-BMdEt No. 226, 1970.
3 see Ri~hard Caves, "Export-l ed Growth and the New Economic History,"
in J.N. Bhagwat: 4~ al, editors, Trade. Bahmce of Payments and Growth, In
Honor of Charles P. Kfodlcber r;er, Amsterdam, North-Ho lland, 1971, especiall y
PP• 419-38.
4
Thomas L. Hutcheson • "Incentiv es for Industria lization in Colombia ,"
Ph.D. dissertat ion, Departmen t of Economics , Universit y of Michigan, 1973.
5

Thomas L. Hutcheson , .2.E.• ~ , Appendix B, pp. 147-148.

6

These and other case studies are reported in Daniel Vargas and Eduardo

11
Wiesner, "Las e.'>:portacionei:. y el empleo; Una perspecti va para Colombia,

FEDESARROLLO, Dogota, Nover.1ber 1971.
domestic resource cost results:

There is little mystery in these

one typically start6 ~ith labor-int ensive

exports selling at world prices, and corapares them with heavily protected
activitie s whose output sell domestica lly at prices twice or more those in
world markets.

The further contribut ion made to the gap in domestic resource
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costs by cost structure differences and guesses about shadow input prices
is quite small.
7
see Francisco E. Thoumi, "Evolucion de la Industria Manufacturera
Fabril 1958-1967," DA..~E-Bl1dE, No. 236, March 1971, P• 60.
8

navid Morawitz, "Import Substitution, Employr.1ent and Foreign Exchange

in Colombia:

No Cheers for Petrochemicals, 11 mimeographed, September 1972.

Morawitz adds:

"In Colombia petrochenicals received more government

finance and support than any other industrial sector in the 1960s.

For

example, in 1969 chemicals and petrochemicals participated 40 percent in the
portfolio of the largest government industrial development agency (IFI) and
received 25 perceut of all credits and refinancings granted by the govern
ment's Private Im1 estment Ftmd (FIP), in spite of the fact that it generated
only 8 percent of industrial production and employment." (p. 1).
9

For an early analysis of this industry see Bernard E. Hunk, "The

Colombian Automotive Industry:

The Welfare Consequences of Import Substitu

tion," mimeographed, August 1968.

That paper was pessimistic regarding

cost reductions in this industry even assuming Andean integration.
lOSpeculative hoJ.din;:.~s of importable-f;oods inventories were emphasized
by Alberto Roque ausalcm, but from a balance of payments. and macroeconoc1ic
perspective.

See his Dinc:ro 1

Inf.la_s:J-on

y BcJla!,2-"c de Pa£;os:

La Expericncia

de Colo:nbia en l.1 Po:1t-(,u1lrr.:1, Banco de la Republica, Bogotii, 1971•

particularly Chapter I.
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11

see Francisco E. Thoumi, "The Utilization of Fixed Industrial Capital

in Colo;nbia:
12

R.

s.

Some [mpirical Findings," mimeographed, December 1973.

See my "The Andean Common Market:

Gestation and Outlook," in

Eck.aus and P. N. Rosenstein-Rod an, Editors, Analysis of Development

ProbleD.s; Studies of the Chilean Economv, North-Holland/A nerican Elsevier,
1973, pp. 293-326.

See also David Horawitz, "Economic Integration Among

11
Less Developed Countries with Special Reference to the Andean Group,

Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 1972.
13

Current tax revenues of the national government expressed as a

percentage of GDP, which reached 9.8 percent in 1970, fell to approximately
9.0 percent by 1973, contributinr; to an impressive fiscal deficit, and a
deteriorating, inflationary situation durinr, 1973 and 1974.

See Covuntura

Econor.1ica, Valui;ie IV, No. 1, April 1974, p. 124 and pp. 133-134.
14

1n a somewhat bizarre move, the U.S. Treasury during 1974 charged

Colombia

with "du.71ping" carnations in the U.S. market, giving as evidence

the CAT received by those exporters.

It will be recalled that the CAT

has been in effect since 1967; its creation uas widely celebrated by U.S.
AID officials.
15

Such a base was taken in my "The Andean Common Harket:

Gestation

and Outlook, 11 .9.£,• cit., p. 326.
16 N ·
· k
.
·
s0t:1ewhat th e 1 in
proce dures may ovcremp h asize
ationa 1 accounting
between the real inport exchange rate and the relative prices of machinery
and equipment by neglecting to fully account for changes in import premia

1
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at times of balance of payments turbulence.
capital goods, however, have been small.

Changes in import duties on

It will also be recalled that

major industrial corporations import directly their machinery and equipment.
17

See my Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic,

Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970, especially Essay 6.

For a long

time, Argentine national accounts expressed at constant prices used 1950
as their base year.

That year witnessed a peak in the Argentine relative

prices of all investment goods, as 1958 did for Colombian ones.

Researchers

using Argentine and Colombian constant price data for cross-country com
parisons have therefore frequently marve~d

at the high investment co

efficients and extraordinary marginal capital-output ratios of those
countries.

Contrary to the Argentine experience, Colombian implicit

prices for the two Dejor commodity-producing sectors have evolved relative
ly undramatically, relative to the GNP deflater, as follows (1958•100):
Agriculture and
Livestock

18

Hanufacturins_

1950-54

99.0

109.3

1955-56

104.3

103.5

1957-58

102.7

101.0

1959-62

96.2

103.6

1963-66

96.9

106.0

1967-70

94.3

97.6

1971-72

95.5

97.2

some model-builders have speculated rer;arding such an elasticity.

See W.M. Corden, "Tr-.e Effects of Trade on the Rate of Growth," in
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________________

_;_,
J.N. Bhaguati, et 111, editors, Trade, Balance of Pavments and Growth

Honor of Charles P. r:indleben;er, North-Hollard Publishing Company,
Amsterdam, 1971, Chapter 6, especially pp. 126-131.
19

rt is doubtful whether without the rise in minor and coffee exports

Colanbia could have expanded its foreign debt and attracted other types
of capital to the extent realized since 1967.
20

Leonard

Dudley, "The Effects of Leaming on Employment and Productivity

in the Colombian Hetal Products Sector," mimeographed, September 1973.

21

That statement, of course, stands whether the country is developed

or underdeveloped.

Without the presence of import controls (but with that

of milk subsidies!), the 1973-74 Watergate matter in the United States
showed the many channels through which private interests can manipulate
state power. · The Hatessa scandal in Spain was in fact related to exportpromotion schemes.
22

See R. Albert Berry, "Land Distribution, Income Distribution and

Productivity," Chapter IV of a forthcoming book on the Colombian rural
sector.
23

see FEDESARROLLO, Encuesta Industrial, June 1974, PP• 7-8.

In

1972 these finns had sold 92.7 percent of their output domestically.
24

R. Albert Berry and Hi~el Urrutia, Income Distribution in Colombia,

mimeocraphed, Ch::1pter 12.
25 Here I follow (again!) unpublished estimates of R. Albert Berry,
as well as FEDESATUWLLO, Covuntura Economica, several issues.
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26

Both :ui1ports of goods and services and GDP (at market prices) are

meas,ffed at Cllrrcnt prices.

The perccntap:es will thus reflect changes in

the re lat ion between the ,,verage import exchange rate and the GDP deflater.

For earlier years, the correspondi ng figures arc as follows:

27

1950-54:

12.9%

1955-56:

13.5

1957'.""58:

14.8

1959-62:

14.3

A good share of the recistered DFI eives as its home base countries

,

such as Panama, Curacao, Bahamas, Luxembourc and Liechtenste in, making
further precision as to geographica l origins spurious.

28

see IHF Survcv~, June 3, 1974, p. 165.

29 As reported in World Bank/IDA, Annual Report, 1973, pp. 88-89.

The

correspondi ng 1971 percentages were 21. 1 for Argentina, 17. 1 for Brazil
and 24.7 for Hexico.

